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I will focus on the discussion of unemployment for it is the most surprising. The discussion on money was nothing but an early version of the first part of Money, Interest and Prices, though at this stage Patinkin did not realize that the real balance effect could cope for the inconsistency of the traditional dichotomy. The discussion of unemployment differed in many respects from the theory of unemployment finally presented in chapters 13 and 14 of Money, Interest and Prices. Patinkin adopted an unemployment equilibrium perspective (Rubin, 2002a) and rejected the Pigou effect (Rubin, 2005) . But above all, he developed several concepts that were either abandoned or marginalized in the making of his book. In effect, as shown by Boianovsky in his careful study of the tortuous process leading from Patinkin's thesis to chapters 13 and 14 of Money, Interest and Prices "Patinkin's views about unemployment phenomena" did not evolved "linearly and cumulatively" (2006, 194) .
The first part of the paper analyzes the research program underlying the thesis. The second part presents Patinkin's 1947 theory of involuntary unemployment. This part of the thesis displayed a mathematical apparatus composed of 325 equations and a burgeoning set of models. This apparatus has been simplified and its notations homogenised. Part 3 and part 4 study how Patinkin and the members of the Cowles Commission failed to realize the full implications of his research program. It is argued that with his "theory of compromise" and his concept of "additional restraint", Patinkin had gathered nearly all the ingredients to forge the twin notions of "spillover effect" and "dual decision hypothesis". The concept of "spillover" was developed later by Patinkin (1952 Patinkin ( , 1956 . The "dual decision hypothesis" was put forward by Clower (1965) . Both concepts were pieced together by Robert Barro and Herschel Grossman in a famous 1971 article and played a crucial role in disequilibrium macroeconomics. Part 5 concludes on Patinkin's position in the history of disequilibrium theories.
Patinkin's research program
The second part of Patinkin's thesis addressed three issues. First, Patinkin intended to derive a Keynesian macromodel from a Walrasian model. Second and in order to do so, he proposed to elaborate the microeconomics of action under "additional restraints". Finally, he wanted to reconcile the kind of adjustment at work in Samuelson's diagonal cross diagram with the law of supply and demand. I will show how this research program emerged out of the intellectual context of the mid-forties at the University of Chicago.
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But as we will show below, the models of the Lausanne school were also presented as the models of reference in the second part of the thesis. There Patinkin undertook a Walrasian reconstruction of Keynes' theory of unemployment in order to clarify its foundations.
The idea that an integration of the Keynesian and the Walrasian theories would strengthen the Keynesian position came from Lange (1938 Lange ( , 1944 and from Hicks (1939) . In his autobiography, Patinkin (1995, 371) wrote that, in his course on business cycle theory, Lange offered a detailed presentation of the General Theory based on "The rate of interest and the optimum propensity to consume" (1938) . In this article, Lange presented Keynes' apparatus, identified with the IS-LM model, as a simplified version of the Walrasian model:
Thus both the Keynesian and the traditional theory of interest are but two limiting cases of what may be regarded to be the general theory of interest. It is a feature of great historical interest that the essentials of this general theory are contained already in the work of Walras. (1938, 20) And also:
Thus Mr. Keynes apparatus involves a considerable simplification of the theory. (1938, 23) The basis for this interpretation was the belief that Keynes assumed a horizontal supply curve for labor (Lange, 1938, 31) . This implied that labor market clearing was compatible with involuntary unemployment, so that a Keynesian unemployment equilibrium was only a subcategory of the Walrasian equilibrium. In Price, Flexibility and Employment (1944) , Lange approached the General Theory from a different angle and argued that to prove the generality of Keynes' chapter 19 one had to restate its conclusions in a complete general equilibrium perspective. This approach was inspired by Value and Capital. In the introduction of his famous book Hicks announced that he would assess Keynes' results in the light of the "pure logical analysis of capitalism" in order to " [clear] up several important things [Keynes] left not very clear" (1946, 4) . Retrospectively, this way of approaching Keynes' works seems far from being obvious. Keynes developed the General Theory from within the Marshallian tradition, a tradition that displayed a conception of the market more or less incompatible with the Walrasian conception 2 . However, for Hicks (1934 Hicks ( , 1939 and Lange (1932) Alfred Marshall and Léon Walras' conceptions of the market were complementary 3 .
For different reasons, Hicks and Lange did not probe into the relations between the IS-LM model and the temporary equilibrium model that both of them used to discuss Keynes' ideas.
In 1939, Hicks did not consider IS-LM as a Walrasian construct. It was the model of the 2 See Clower (1989) and De Vroey (1999a , 1999b and 2004 .
3 On Lange's belief in the complementary between Marshall and Walras see Lendjel (2001) .
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General Theory, a framework which descended from the Marshallian tradition (Hicks, 1937, 150; 1950, 4 Like many Keynesians involved in the neoclassical synthesis, Patinkin was a child of the Great Depression 6 . Hence, even though the choice of his thesis topic was not straightforward, it was not totally by chance that, in the end, he started to work on unemployment 7 . According 6 to him, unemployment or more precisely involuntary unemployment was "the very question that brought forth the General Theory" (1949, 360 ). Yet, the concept that Keynes had put forward in chapter 2 of his book had not been given enough attention.
After the publication of the General Theory in 1936, a number of economists tried to capture Keynes message within formal models of the IS-LM type 8 . Among them, some, like Hicks (1937) , completely left aside the concept of involuntary unemployment. The others accounted for it by assuming a horizontal supply curve of labor. The main advocate of this curve was Lange:
Involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense is not an excess supply of labor but an equilibrium position obtained by intersection of a demand and a supply curve, the supply curve of labor, however, being infinitely elastic over a wide range with respect to money wages, the point of intersection being to the left of the region where elasticity of supply of labor with respect to money wages becomes finite. (Lange, 1944, 6) The notion of a "perfectly elastic supply of labor" can also be found in Franco Modigliani's influential 1944 paper on IS-LM.
The way Patinkin himself tackled this issue was not based on Keynes' definition of involuntary unemployment (Boianovsky, 2006, 209) . His starting point was a critique of the way Lange and Modigliani defined and represented this concept, a critique that opened the way for a rational reconstruction. As he put it in a report to the Social Sciences Research
Council, which financed his doctoral studies:
The point taken by my research was that none of the current theories of unemployment had emphasized its involuntary aspect. All of them were expressed in terms of demand and supply curve of labor, and workers were always 'on their supply curve'. From my viewpoint this did not represent involuntary unemployment since workers were acting precisely as they desired, as represented by their supply curve. (Patinkin, Final report for the Social Sciences Research Council, June 1947) Here, Patinkin clearly attacked the assumption of a horizontal supply of labor curve. The quotation shows that he assimilated the aggregate supply curve of labor and the curve expressing an individual workers' desired supply of labor. Since the labor supply curve expressed the preferences of workers, their situation could hardly be called involuntary when trade was occurring at the intersection of the demand and the supply schedules, whether the latter was horizontal or not. In the conclusion of his dissertation, Patinkin made his point a bit differently by highlighting the absurdity of Lange and Modigliani's approach. In their 7 reasoning, a slight change in the behaviors or workers could turn a situation of "involuntary unemployment" into a situation of full employment:
The artificiality of this definition is sufficiently demonstrated if one considers the case in which the supply curve instead of being horizontal in the interval (0, N 1 ), the supply curve rises with a slope of 0.001! (1947, 115 ).
Instead of using Lange's horizontal curve, Patinkin maintained the assumption of a standard "notional" supply of labor function and defined "involuntary unemployment" as a situation where workers were "off their supply curve": "In order to be acting involuntarily,
[workers] must be off their supply curve" (Final Report to the Social Sciences Research Council).
This approach raised a new problem. How could involuntary unemployment, so defined, match with choice theory? "Involuntary" in Patinkin's "off the curve" sense meant "not chosen". But economic theory only dealt with chosen outcomes. Economic action and voluntary action were one and the same thing. To escape this contradiction, Patinkin insisted on the relative nature of "involuntary action" and developed the concept of "additional restraint". The fact that unemployed were not "on their curve" did not mean that they were on no curve. Though they did not achieve their Walrasian plans, they were still guided by a plan but one including "additional restraints". Their behavior was then "involuntary" as compared to the behavior defined by Walrasian plans, plans without additional restraints, reflecting what agents "truly" desired". Unemployed were "coerced" "in a relative sense only":
Though the existence of widespread involuntary unemployment is historically irrefutable, economic theory has yet to deal adequately with it. Involuntary unemployment involves what might be called 'relative coercion': people cannot fulfill their desires as freely as under some other situation which serves as a norm of reference. Hence in order to give concreteness to the concept of coercion we must first define this norm of reference. It is theoretically meaning less to speak of involuntary unemployment without introducing a comparison between two alternative models: the actually existing one and some designated norm. I must emphasize that I define coercion and freedom in a relative sense only. People acting with the 'normal' freedom (i.e. under the restrictions to be found in the norm of reference) will (for the sake of brevity) be defined as fulfilling their desires freely. People acting under more than the 'normal' restrictions will be said to be coerced and prevented from fulfilling their desires. In most of what follows our norm of reference is defined as a model in which the economic unit is restricted only by the budget restraint and technological relationships (e.g. the production function). (1947a, 79) The notion of "additional restraint" expressed with remarkable clarity the necessity of modifying the Walrasian budget constraint, the "budget restraint" in Patinkin's language, in order to obtain a disequilibrium model out of a Walrasian framework. In the conclusion of his 8 thesis, Patinkin clarified further his thinking and deepened his insight in presenting a mathematical formulation of it 9 . He wrote down a maximization program showing how, in a disequilibrium state, agents' calculus would produce new behavior functions, the g i functions,
resulting from the combination of a Walrasian budget constraint and an additional constraint.
These would express simultaneously the fact that agents suffered from rationing and the fact that they still had a margin of choice concerning their desired quantities. In this particular instance, Patinkin imagined "some sort of rationing control". This illustration referred to the context of World War II, when consumers had to face price controls and rationing. Not being able to purchase the desired quantities of some goods, the consumer would have to allocate differently his income taking "rationing control" into account. In the ensuing comments,
Patinkin explained that the same approach could be applied to firms and unemployed workers.
But if we do apply his approach in the case of unemployed, the g i functions become "effective demands" à la Clower (1965) as opposed to the "notional" or Walrasian demands noted h i resulting from the budget constraint only:
In general, for any given set of prices and income, the amount purchased, as given by g i , will differ from that
given by h i . So even though the consumer may be on his g i function, he is not fulfilling his desires; for the desires of the individual are defined as being represented by his f i [sic] functions.
In a similar fashion, application of an additional restriction to the maximization procedures of firms and workers may still leave them free to maximize utility or profit. In this case, too, even though the worker is on a curve (of the type (62.7)), he is not on the one he "really" desires. 10 As shown by Boianovsky (2006, 206-8) , another source of Patinkin's notion of additional restraint may have been his dissatisfaction with the mathematical representation of the formation of general equilibrium in Lange (1944) and Samuelson (1941) Hicks (1937) and by Lange (1938) . He maintained that the characteristic assumption of Keynes' theory was the assumption of downward nominal wage rigidity:
It is usually considered as one of the most important achievements of the Keynesian theory that it explains the consistency of economic equilibrium with the presence of involuntary unemployment. It is, however, not sufficiently recognized that, except in a limiting case to be considered later, this result is due entirely to the assumption of 'rigid wages' and not to the Keynesian liquidity preference. (1944, 65) 11 For a similar interpretation see Dutt (2002, 332 Now, if the whole purpose of Keynes is to say that with rigid wages we can have unemployment 'equilibrium', I really do not see his contribution. This is a point that would have been admitted by classical economists themselves, but Keynes (on page 12, line 9 and following) seems to argue that the classical position on this point was wrong : that there could be unemployment for other reasons. (Patinkin, 1948, 2) According to Patinkin, the explanation of unemployment through wage rigidity was the classical one. Revolution (1947 Revolution ( )" (1995 . In this book, Klein argued that the characteristic assumptions of the Keynesian model were that investment and savings were "interest inelastic" or "insensitive" in respect to variations of the rate of interest. Given these assumptions, he asserted that an IS-LM model with flexible prices and wages could have no equilibrium solution. The problem, in this setting, came from the fact that equilibrium of savings and investment for a full employment income could imply a negative rate of interest. Yet such a negative value was excluded. As a result, the aggregate demand remained less than the aggregate supply of goods. Klein interpreted this result as a demonstration of the incapacity of the market system to guarantee a perfect coordination of economic activities. But such a situation described a "hyper-deflationary" system and was not realistic. Therefore, he introduced wage rigidity in his model to guarantee the existence of an unemployment equilibrium. Still, the exogenous wage was not the cause of unemployment in his model: "In the Keynesian system lower wages need not do any good" (Klein, 1947, 87) . Given the psychology of households and entrepreneurs, there was no equilibrium of savings and investment compatible with full employment. Hence, even with the exogenous wage reduced to zero, full employment would not be restored.
Klein was a major source of inspiration for Patinkin's thesis. But while he adopted his explanation of involuntary unemployment, he dismissed his Keynesian version of IS-LM.
Patinkin actually jumped from the idea that involuntary unemployment was not a consequence of money-wage rigidity to the contention that wage rigidity, and a fortiori price rigidity, had to be excluded from the Keynesian theory. In other words, this theory had to demonstrate that a perfectly competitive system with price and wage flexibility could suffer from chronic unemployment. His correspondence offers clear evidence in support of this interpretation, as the following passage taken from a letter to Wassily Leontief illustrates:
The second issue, and one with which, as I understand it, Keynes is really concerned is: Is a wage decrease the way to solve the problem of unemployment? The Classical answer is yes; Keynes' answer is no for reasons which he sets out in chapter 19 of the General Theory. (…). This position can be maintained without assuming wage rigidity. In fact, what it says is that despite wage flexibility, full employment will not be restored. ( 
The macroeconomics of "inconsistent systems"
Starting from the preceding ingredients, the Walrasian perspective, the problem of involuntary unemployment and the ambition to find something better than IS-LM with rigid wages, Patinkin developed a bold construction. His theory would show that when the price mechanism did not lead the economic system towards general equilibrium in the Walrasian meaning of the terms, a distinct kind of equilibrium would emerge out of a bargaining process. This competing general equilibrium concept would feature simultaneously involuntary unemployment and flexible prices.
Microfoundations of the classical macromodel and origins of unemployment
In the introduction of the second part of his thesis, on involuntary unemployment, Patinkin stated that his "first task [would] be the formation (by aggregation) of these macromodels from the Casselian equations previously considered" (1947, 51) 12 . In other words, Patinkin's intended to derive his macromodels from a Walrasian one. To begin with, he explained how to derive individual demand functions including money income as one of their components 13 .
Then he contended that his analysis offered the basis to obtain a "Casselian system of equations", a set of n equilibrium conditions of the type supply of commodity i equals demand. The aggregation of the supply and demand functions of this system was then supposed to give rise to the following classical macromodel:
The function X D defined the aggregate demand for goods. It increased in respect to income and decreased in respect to the rate of interest. Patinkin ignored the "Pigou effect" for theoretical as well as empirical reasons 14 . The aggregate supply of goods was constant. It represented the full employment supply derived from the labor market equilibrium.
Eventually, the aggregate income was defined by the aggregate supply. Equations (5) and (6) 12 Or "My interest is in moving from the semi-microequations to the macroequations which play so prominent a role in current economic discussion" (Patinkin, 1947, 57) . 13 More on this point below.
14 Patinkin justified this neglect stating that "whatever empirical evidence does exist lends little support to [Pigou's] hypothesis" (1947, 73) . For the theoretical reason and Patinkin's evolution on this point see Rubin (2005) .
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are respectively the condition for equilibrium on the market for bonds and the condition for equilibrium on the market for money.
Following Klein (1947) , Patinkin intended to show that this classical system could be "inconsistent" or that it could have no equilibrium solution:
The argument is made that the cause of this inconsistency is the insensitivity of savings and investment to fluctuations in the interest rate. This insensitivity creates a situation in which there exists (potentially) more savings at the full employment level than can be offset by investments. Hence this full employment level cannot be brought into existence. (Patinkin, 1947, 51) In terms of the above system, this amounted to say that the equilibrium condition on the goods market η = G( η, r) might imply a negative rate of interest 15 . Such a rate was deemed incompatible with equation (6) for it would have entailed an infinite demand for money. In other words, the equilibrium condition on the market for money implied the condition r ≥ 0.
By definition, in a system without full employment solution, price and wage flexibility could not bring back full employment. In his dissertation, Patinkin interpreted this result as demonstrating that the problem of involuntary unemployment was inherent to the classical system, which represented a perfectly competitive market economy:
If the worker is unemployed, it is not because he wants to be, but because the basic inconsistency of the system makes it impossible to satisfy his desires. (Patinkin, 1947, 116) This was only the first stage in the elaboration of Patinkin's theory of involuntary unemployment.
Unemployment equilibrium: the "macroeconomic" approach
For Patinkin, a model without an equilibrium solution could "not describe the real world" (1947: 78) . Therefore, the classical model had to be amended to obtain an unemployment equilibrium. But he refused to resort to the assumption of wage rigidity and put forward instead what he coined as a "theory of compromise".
a) The determination of employment on the market for goods
In order to develop his unemployment theory, Patinkin started from a simplified classical model. The economist still claimed to deal with a monetary economy but eliminated the rate 14 of interest from the demand for goods 16 . Variations of monetary aggregates did not affect the markets for goods and labor so the equations for the bonds and the money markets could be put aside. The system consisted of equations (2), (3), (4) and (7):
Patinkin used Samuelson's diagonal-cross diagram to illustrate his theory. From this point of view, one defect of Keynes' theory was that it ignored the global supply of goods as derived from the equilibrium on the labor market (1947, 87) . Once this supply side was reintroduced in the model, the inconsistency pointed earlier could appear clearly. Supply, The fact that the supply curve and the demand curve did not cut the bisecting line on the same point illustrated the absence of equilibrium.
According to Patinkin the initial "inconsistent system" determined two distinct values for income. The first one, η, was defined by the labor market clearing or by the "subsystem" (2),
and (4). It expressed the income "desired" by the suppliers of goods. The second one, 16 "Let us now consider the real part of the system and see what happens when it becomes overdetermined.
For this purpose I assume that r does not enter the expenditure function." (Patinkin, 1947, 82) 
defined by the equation Y =F(Y) or by the "subsystem" (7), (3) and (4), was the income Y 1 on figure 1. This value expressed the income "desired" by the buyers of goods. In order to account for the existence of an equilibrium with unemployment, Patinkin introduced his "theory of compromise". He explained that when such "disagreement" occurred between the two sides of the market, a "compromise" had to be reached the outcome of which depended on the respective "bargaining powers" of suppliers and demanders 17 . The stronger the "bargaining power" of demanders, the nearer to their desired income they would get. Thus, a priori, the equilibrium income could take any value between the full employment income and the income determined by the outlet constraint. Happily enough, according to Patinkin, in the "normal situation" and in a case of excess supply, the demanders were the one to lay down their conditions:
Assume, for example, that suppliers have no bargaining power. This means that buyers need make no compromise and can force the suppliers to accept the level of Y which they (the buyers) desire. (…). I believe this to be a description of the normal situation in our economy. It should be emphasized that this superior bargaining power implies no personal relationship between buyers and sellers. It is reflected by the simple institutional fact that as a rule buyers can obtain anything they want, and cannot be forced to purchase anything they do not; suppliers, on the other hand, are not always free to sell the entire amount they desire. The failure of Keynes and his followers to discuss the issue in terms of overdeterminacy was due to the fact that they almost never introduced the supply curve explicitly into the discussion. (1947, 87) According to Patinkin, the Keynesian adjustment mechanism was justified because the law of supply and demand failed to clear the markets. This mechanism was now founded on his 17 This approach was also inspired by Klein (1947, 87 ) who referred to the "superior bargaining power of the employer over the employee" to explain why "workers will not remain on their supply curve of labor".
18 For a detailed analysis of Patinkin's contribution to the theory of aggregate supply see Boianovsky (2002) .
theory of compromise. Though on the goods market and in a "normal situation" this boiled down to a short side condition.
b) The determination of the real wage on the labor market
Patinkin presented the preceding model in chapter 7 of the thesis. He analyzed the situation that this model implied on the labor market in chapter 9. Whereas chapter 7 presented the compromise between the group of buyers and the group of sellers, chapter 9 was about the compromise between firms and workers 19 . The model finally consisted of equations (2), (3), (4), (7) plus the following equations:
Once output was determined, equations (9), (10) and (11) determined the equilibrium real wage. The "theory of compromise" was again at work. In a "normal" economic situation, income was fixed by the demand for goods. To this income corresponded a certain level of employment given by the production function. There were two different real wages in these conditions. The real wage defined by the labor demand curve (equation 9) was the maximum available to workers hence the one they desired. Inversely, the real wage defined by the labor supply equation was the minimum that workers would accept hence the one desired by firms.
This disagreement called for a compromise. As in the preceding case, the outcome depended on the "bargaining powers" of both parties. Equation (11) Last but not least, the economist believed that it was "more meaningful to have the compromise between employers and workers" (1947, 88) . Therefore, in contrast with his "macroeconomic" model, the "microeconomic" model focused exclusively on the labor market.
The classical model used as a benchmark in chapter 8 shared the simplifications introduced to deal with the Keynesian macroeconomic model. But the equilibrium condition for the labor market was now explicit. The model consisted of equations (3), (4), (7), (12) and (13).
Y = F(N)
At this stage of his presentation, Patinkin did not mention the money market. But we can assume that he implicitly put it aside owing to Walras' law. This being said, his system was clearly "inconsistent". Save a happy coincidence, equations (3), (4), (7) The system is incomplete until we show how this unemployment is spread among the different workers" (Patinkin, 1947, 88) . 22 The repartition of unemployed between sectors was determined by exogenous parameters.
non-tâtonnement process. But the notion of tâtonnement was absent from the thesis. And probably because he refused to assume price rigidity, Patinkin found a different way out. He solved the difficulty by using a procedure similar to the one he employed in his "macroeconomic" analysis. He built two subsystems out of his classical model, each one now being supposed to determine a real wage and an employment level. The idea was the following. The Walrasian model was overdetermined, it contained one equation too many.
Hence, Patinkin abandoned the equilibrium condition for the labor market. Then he considered two cases. In the first one, he assumed that "workers direct the economy" (1947, 91) . The latter calculated a real wage that would equilibrate the market for goods assuming that production was a function of the labor supply. In the second one, "employers control the economy" (1947, 92) . Like workers, firms calculated a real wage that would equilibrate the market for goods assuming this time that production was a function of labor demand. To begin with, equation (13) was put aside. Then, in the "workers' model", the labor supply function was introduced in the production function and the production function replaced income in the equilibrium condition for the goods market. The result was an equation giving an equilibrium real wage (equation 14) and, consequently, the levels of employment and production (equations 15 and 16):
In order to obtain the "employers' model", Patinkin used the same procedure with labor demand replacing labor supply:
Retrospectively, one realizes that, interpreted in this way, Patinkin's approach would have suffered from a serious flaw. The way he presented them did not modify the fact that the adjustment variable of equations (14) and (17) (7) is replaced by a function of the real wage, the "workers' model" and the "employers' model" can give rise to two distinct levels of employment with N e < N f .
After having characterized the situation of the economy by measuring the gap between N e and N f , Patinkin used his "theory of compromise" to define the transactions agents realized on the labor market 23 . The level of transactions was determined by the respective bargaining powers of agents: 1947: 93) . In the same way, the quantity of labor supplied by workers was a function of their desired labor supply and of their "coefficient of compromise" β. Equation (22) defined the equilibrium condition for transactions: it showed that "for the successful functioning of the economy, it is necessary that the sum of compromise coefficients cover the difference submitted to compromise" (1947, 93).
Since transactions determined by the "theory of compromise" did not coincide with the transactions desired by agents, they implied the existence of ex-post constraints that had to be introduced in agents' decision programs:
Assume that a successful compromise is reached. We can now consider [(20) ] and [(21)] as additional restrictions on the maximization procedure of firms and workers. (1947, 93) Firms maximized the following objective function:
And workers maximized :
Patinkin decomposed households' choice in two stages. In the first stage they chose between "real income" WN/P and leisure L given a constant amount of time T. In the second stage only they decided how to "allocate their income among different purchases" (1947, 53) . , N e , and N f . But they do not attempt to "describe the real world;" for this purpose we would have to construct a third consistent model, Q 3 " (1947, 92) 22
The fact that the "additional restraint" imposed by the compromise on the labor market impinged on consumers choice and implied an effective demand for goods distinct from the notional demand was not seen by Patinkin. Writing down agents' maximizing program was important mainly because it showed that they acted "involuntarily":
In the terminology of section 38, these additional restraints (i.e., additional to the budget identity and production function) mean that firms and workers are being coerced. They are being forced to compromise, and prevented from fulfilling their desires. (1947, 94) Once the level of employment was determined, and the involuntary nature of actions clarified, output, the demand for goods and the real wage were supposed to be determined respectively by the production function, the notional demand function for goods and the equilibrium condition on the market for goods. Here, the ambiguity pointed out above Once he had presented the general structure of his model, Patinkin elaborated upon his theory of compromise. Each agent was endowed with a "compromise coefficient". α ij was the coefficient of firm i in industry j and β ijk the coefficient of worker k in firm i of industry j. On this basis he discussed the role of social conflict in the attainment of equilibrium. The sum of coefficients α and β might not be equal to one. This meant that firms and workers failed to compromise and that the system "ceases to function" (1947, 97):
Then the indivuals might attempt to influence the α ij and the β ijk of the others to make them more willing to compromise. Thus resort may be had to strikes or lockouts, violent or peaceful. Or one group may succeed in getting Congress to pass laws in its favour (e.g. laws for or against collective bargaining, unions, etc.). (…).
In extreme cases one of the groups may resort to revolution to force the others to compromise. The whole system then breaks down until the new realignment of powers is settled. (1947, 97) Compromise coefficients were supposed to reflect "institutional factors". Younger workers and unorganized workers would have higher compromise coefficient than older workers and members of unions and would have to accept more unemployment. But a conflict might also appear between the workers themselves about the distribution of employment. Patinkin also presented a model in which the compromise was being determined at the industry level.
Although Patinkin devoted a lot of attention to the careful exposition of his theory of compromise, this attempt to graft conflict and class struggle onto a Walrasian framework did not convince the members of the Cowles Commission.
Appraising the thesis: Cowles Commission members on the theory of compromise
The reports made on the drafts of the thesis by the members of the Cowles Commission criticized heavily his theory of unemployment. Jacob Marschak, the chairman of his thesis Second, they rejected the general method he followed in order to define realized transactions. One could not define equilibrium quantities by way of a "compromise" between the equilibrium quantities of two heterogeneous models or Patinkin's "subsystems". An economist had to build a consistent model starting from agents' behaviors. As put by
Koopmans:
The real world is not overdetermined. The task of the economist is not to work out a compromise between two logically incompatible theories, but to construct a realistic and consistent theory. 25 First, this unemployment situation cannot be an equilibrium situation; for from (9.2) we see that the price level will keep on changing and will never settle down as long as there remains any unemployment. (Patinkin, Inconsistent Systems and Involuntary Unemployment ,1948?, 27) Patinkin's thesis put forward a new research program. But its definition was still confused and the resulting theory very awkward. Cowles Commissioners were able to point out this awkwardness but they did not understand the consistency and the relevance of his undertaking behind the flaws. 1956, 157) , an excess demand on one market could "spillover" on other markets and affect directly their prices. For when individuals could not buy all they want on one market, they would try to use their unspent funds to buy other commodities. Symmetrically, when firms could not sell all their production, they would limit their purchases and in particular their labor demand (1956, 217) .
Appraising the thesis: the concept of additional restraint in retrospect
This way, an excess supply on the goods market would "spillover" on the labor market.
Clower (1965, 113 ) renamed Patinkin's "intermarket pressure" the "spillover effect". The expression was then used by Grossman (1971, 948) , who tried to elaborate a "theory of The assumption of the previous section is that in times of unemployment, there is no a priori reason to expect the real wage to equal the marginal product. In the traditional theory, this equality is presumably brought about by the competition of employers to obtain workers; but in times of unemployment, such competition obviously does not exist" (Patinkin, 1947, 113) . 25 See Boianovsky (2006) for a detailed analysis of Patinkin's hesitations on this point.
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compromise on the market for goods, his attempt to formalize firms' choice under additional restraints could have led him to write the very program that was put forward by Barro and Grossman (1971, 85) 
Households
In the case of households Patinkin had gathered all the ingredients necessary to find Clower's concept of "constrained demand functions" (1965, 119) . Using his formalization of household maximization program (1947, and following his definition of workers choice under additional restraint (1947, 94) we get the following result. As workers households maximized
U(WN/P, L)
subject to 26 "Employers recognize that workers as a group desire to offer more labor than employers as a group desire to purchase. Therefore they will compromise and agree to hire more workers" (Patinkin, 1947: 93) .
L + N = T and N =N
Therefore as consumers, they should have maximized
subject to the budget constraint : (1947, 82) 27 Here I preserve Patinkin's presentation which did not distinguish clearly between goods, bonds and money.
Note in particular the absence of any real balance effect. Furthermore, at various stage of his presentation,
Patinkin assumed two propensities to consume, one out of wages and the other out of profits. And in chapter 6, profits did not appear in the maximization program of "individuals". In others words, he introduced implicitly a class structure in his economy. In order to simplify the presentation, I assume that workers receive firms' nominal profits Π.
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Starting from this premise, Patinkin considered that he did not have to examine the choice of consumer-workers in the context of unemployment.
If we go back to the section 28 of the thesis, mentioned in the quotation from chapter 8, we can see how the mistake crept in. Patinkin explicitly raised the issue of the introduction of income in the demand functions:
The discussion in this chapter will concern itself with macroeconomic models. Usually a fundamental role in these models is played by the variable y representing money income. But our previous analysis has developed the excess demand functions as dependent on prices only. Our first task will accordingly be the investigation of changes in the maximization procedure which will cause the excess demand functions to depend on y also.
For this to be true, y must bear the same relationship to the individual as did prices in the Walras-Pareto system. In other words, when the individual comes to decide on his purchases, he must consider his income as a given quantity which he can no longer affect. And this given income must then be allocated among the different goods. (1947, 52) Patinkin believed that a "double maximization procedure" was the solution 28 . The choice of workers between leisure and labor would determine consumers' income. As a consequence, income could be treated as an exogenous datum of the choice between different goods (as in the maximization program presented above). 28 "One way of doing this is to consider the maximization procedure as broken up into two steps." (1947, 52) 29 Another paragraph of the thesis shows how close Patinkin got to Clower's effective demand theory:
"Secondly, in order to introduce y a into the demand functions it is not necessary to assume a double maximization procedure of the type discussed here. All that is necessary is that in some way the individual should consider his money income given when he comes to select his purchases. Thus in the case where workers have no choice over either working hours or wage rate, their income will be taken as given and will enter their demand functions." (1947, Patinkin's hesitation concerning the variable that cannot be decided by workers, "working hours or wage rate", shows again that his thought was still confused on this matter.
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In the "technical appendix" of The Keynesian Revolution, Klein (1947, 258-61) 30 explained the "Mathematical derivation of the system of the General Theory". The basis for the derivation of the Keynesian consumption function, the demand for bonds and the liquidity preference function was a maximization program in which income appeared as an exogenous variable. Though, in his analysis of the message of the General Theory, Klein assumed that the labor supply was an increasing function of the real wage (1947, 74-5 and 87) , like
Patinkin, he dissociated the choice between labor and leisure and the decision concerning the allocation of income. Unlike him, he did not comment on this option and the foundations of the labor supply were not explained. Klein simply followed the standard procedure:
In the theory of consumer behavior, the usual practice is to start out with the utility function (or a monotonic transformation of the same), derive the utility-maximization equations, and finally solve the demand equations in terms of prices and income. (Klein, 1946, 306) In Price, Flexibility and Employment, Lange wrote down the choice of a consumer only once and in this instance he also treated income as an exogenous variable (1944, note 6, 16) . As stressed by De Vroey (1999a, 322) , a hallmark of the Marshallian approach is the assumption that agents try to guess the equilibrium price of the market before it opens. As in Marshall's corn market (chapter 2, book V of the Principles), agents anticipate the demand 31 For the lack of adequate method to deal with general equilibrium in Modigliani (1944) , see Rubin (2004) .
curve and the supply curve of a given market, deduce the equilibrium price and decide the quantity that they will produce or demand accordingly. Even though Patinkin made no reference to expectations, the approach he followed in chapter 8 of the thesis was of a Marshallian sort. As I explained in section 2.3, firms and workers determined their desired levels of employment on the basis of their own models of the economy. But of course, in
Patinkin's theory agents could not guess the correct magnitudes.
Conclusion: Patinkin's thesis and later disequilibrium theories
And it is this personal experience of knowing, but not knowing -knowing something, but not realizing its "obvious" implications for other problems with which I was concurrently dealing until a later point of time, an experience that I have had on other occasions as well -that has strongly influenced my subsequent work in the history of doctrines, especially that dealing with the discovery of the "General Theory". (Patinkin, 1995, 382) In (1975) or Grandmont (1977) is concerned (De Vroey, 2004, 117) . This project led Patinkin to lay down a number of concepts that pointed in the direction of disequilibrium theories. The theory of compromise showed that in a disequilibrium context, an adjustment mechanism distinct from the price mechanism was needed. It also implied the notion of a non-Walrasian equilibrium. In contrast with the stance of his later contributions (Patinkin, 1948 and 1956) deeper. This is why in his conclusion he came back to the notion of additional restraint stating that a result more general than the behavior of firms and workers presented in his chapter 8 was possible:
62. In the analysis of chapter VIII it turned out that when the additional restriction was used, the behavior unit was no longer free to maximize utility or profit. In general, this need not be so; maximization subject to the additional restriction may still result in a schedule of alternatives. (1947, 116) But Patinkin's reasoning was impeded by a partial equilibrium approach. In addition, the standard theory of consumers' choice taking income as an independent variable prevented him from realizing the breach of continuity between the behavior of the Keynesian consumer and the behavior of the Walrasian consumer. The novelty was the tâtonnement method inspired by Lange (1944) and Walras (1926) and developed in the preceding chapters of the book. Patinkin argued more forcefully than he did in the thesis that the behavior of firms in the Keynesian scenario was at odds with the Walrasian behavior. This chapter 13 was a decisive 33 "First, although I was a discussant of Clower's well-known article "The Keynesian counterrevolution": a theoretical appraisal" (1965) when it was first presented at a 1962 conference, only some time after I had published the second edition of my Money, Interest and Prices (1965) (on which I was working at the time of the conference) did I realize that his "dual decision hypothesis" about the behavior of consumers who were recipients of income from labor was simply the obverse side of the contention of my chapter 13 that the inability of firms to sell the quantity indicated by their supply curve for output, drawn at a given real wage, would make unwilling to employ the amount designated on their demand curve for labor for that real wage." (Patinkin, 1995, 382) This anecdote is confirmed by the reading of the discussions printed in the volume edited by Hahn and Brechling (1965) after the Royaumont conference. 34 On this process see Boianovsky (2006) . 35 On this point see Rubin (2004, 198) .
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source of inspiration for Clower (1965) (Patinkin, 1989, xvii; Rubin, 2005b) and Barro and Grossman (1971) after him.
Yet, in some respects, Patinkin's thesis resembled disequilibrium theories of the 1970s more than his chapter 13. Though he still used the "additional restraint" in his definition of involuntary unemployment (1956, 212) , the concept was totally absent from the rest of chapter 13. In Money, Interest and Prices, Patinkin returned to the "'old' style of Marshall and Hicks" (Backhouse, 2002, 188) giving priority to verbal reasoning over algebra. This was probably a consequence of the thesis experience. In his autobiography, Patinkin regretted the emphasis on mathematics in his dissertation, and explained how afterwards he had tried to
give a priority to the economic intuition:
For like most doctoral students (then, and I am afraid even more so now), I attributed too much importance to the technique and formal mathematical analysis. And so my thesis gave much emphasis on the rigorous derivation of theorems from definitions, assumptions, and preliminary lemmas, while devoting inadequate attention to the economic interpretation of the analysis. (1995, 383) We have seen how 36 considered to be his most important intuition, the spillover effect, and kept assuming perfect competition but he abandoned the idea of formalizing involuntary action as the outcome of choice under additional restraint. Yet, we suspect that a more profound change of mind was at work behind the exclusion of the concept of additional restraint from Patinkin's central message. In his thesis, Patinkin reconstructed agents' maximizing programs along the lines that would be followed by Barro and Grossman (1971) and this without remorse. The correspondence with Liviatan and Patinkin's comments on Barro and Grossman (1971) at the Perugia conference (Boianovsky, 2006, 244) seem to indicate that at some point he became
convinced that the approach of the thesis was faulty. In 1956 he had come to believe that his programs with additional constraints were inconsistent with the standard behavior of agents in a perfectly competitive system. This way of rationalizing and formalizing the spillover effect was not acceptable. The solution that he called for, in note 9 of chapter 13, was not the elaboration of a non-Walrasian micro like in the thesis but a more sophisticated Walrasian micro. In a letter to Liviatan about the behavior of firms in chapter 13, Patinkin wrote : "I am interested in working on the traditional acceptable way of price theory" (quoted by Boianovsky, 2006, 232) . The same position appeared in the new introduction of the second edition of Money, Interest and Prices in 1989 where he stressed the fact that disequilibrium macroeconomics "violates the assumption of rational economic behaviour" and quoted with approval the works of New Keynesian that "rationalized the seemingly irrational" (1989, xviii) . To conclude, chapter 13 marked a crucial step forward in the elaboration of disequilibrium macroeconomics but it may have contained simultaneously a step backward announcing Lucas notion of equilibrium "discipline". What Clower (1965) or Barro and Grossman (1971) did was to reinvent the concept of choice under additional restraint that
Patinkin had put aside along the way.
(where p i = price and y = income are considered as given) and some additional restriction (say, some sort of rationing control) (62.3) θ(Z 1 , Z 2 ,…, Z n ) = 0.
Then he maximizes (62.4) u (Z 1 ,…, Z n ) -λ 1 (p 1 Z 1 + p 2 Z 2 + … + p n Z n -y) -λ 2 θ(Z 1 , Z 2 ,…, Z n )
To yield the n equations (62.5) u i -λ 1 p i -λ 2 θ i = 0 (i = 1,…, n).
Thus we have n+2 equations (62.2), (62.3), (62.5) in n+2 variables: the Z i , λ 1 , and λ 2 .
Solving in terms of the p i and λ we have (62.6) λ j = f j (p 1 ,…, p n-1 , y) (j = 1,2)
